25 Natural resource rules exist to manage resources and the people that interact with them. These 26 rules often fail because people do not comply with them. Decisions to comply with natural 27 resource rules often are based on attitudes about legitimacy of rules and the perceived risks of 28 breaking rules. Trust in agencies promulgating rules in part may determine perceptions of 29 legitimacy of the rule, and in turn depends on individuals' trust in different agency actors. The 30 purpose of this research was to explore the relationship between fishing rule noncompliance and 31 trust in scientists, a key group within management agencies. We interviewed 41 individuals in 32 one rural fishing community in the Brazilian Pantanal from April to August, 2016, to assess (1) 33 noncompliance rates, (2) noncompliance-related attitudes, and (3) the relationship between trust 34 in scientists and noncompliance decisions in the region. We found that among study participants, 35 noncompliance was common and overt. Trust in scientists performing research in the region was 36 the best predictor of noncompliance rate with a fishing rule (nonparametric rank correlation ρ = 37 -0.717; Probit model pseudo-R 2 = 0.241). Baseline data from this research may help inform 38 future interventions to minimize IUU fishing and protect the Pantanal fishery. Although our 39 results are specific to one community in the Pantanal, trust in scientists is potentially an 40 important factor for compliance decisions in similar situations around the world. These results 41 build not only on compliance theory but also speak to the important role that many scientists play 42 in the geographic areas in which they conduct their research. 
Introduction
48 As human populations grow, they can increase pressure on the environment in which they live 163 rules, separately (38). The questions used in the literature to measure trust, procedural fairness, 164 trustworthiness, and legitimacy are similar (39). Maximizing positive NRM outcomes such as 165 successful sustainable use can be associated with increased or maintaining trust in management 166 authorities (40). Trust helps explain why community-based natural resource management 167 (CBNRM) can lead to more enduring, sustainable, and publicly accepted conservation outcomes 168 over top-down natural resource decision-making by federal or state agencies (41). Conversely, 169 lack of trust in natural resource authorities and agency contribute to delegitimizing the protective 170 conservation measures promulgated by agencies, including rules. Without legitimate rules from 171 trusted NRM agencies, people may perceive environmental risks differently than the agencies 172 and be less consistent in their voluntary compliance.
173
The compelling relationship between trust in agencies and positive natural resource 174 management outcomes has been explored in many different conservation contexts (33,34,42).
175 Interestingly, although natural resource management occurs at different geographic scales (e.g., 176 local, national, transfrontier), trust is often measured at a single scale: managers and management 177 (35). It is noteworthy then that studies exploring the relationship at the local scale, or between 178 trust in scientists and noncompliance, do not exist in the literature, because many scientists do 179 their work in the field often in or near communities impacted by natural resource rules. 328 In commentaries, participants accused amateur fishers without fishing licenses of violating the 329 law the most. Most reported that they, personally, were usually compliant with the pacu catch 330 size rule (34 or 85% indicated they would break the rule "sometimes," "rarely," or "never" in the 331 coming year). A small minority of participants indicated they would break the rule all the time (n 332 = 4, 9.7%); three participants reported breaking the rules often (7.3%) and six said they never 333 would break the rules (14.6%). The average rate of self-reported future noncompliance among 334 participants was 2.5, or between "rarely" and "sometimes." The sentiment in the community of 335 professional fishermen is that there are others-amateurs, professionals, and tourists-violating 336 the fishing rules often, but virtually nobody identified themselves as part of the problem.
337 Noncompliance rates correlated negatively with age (ρ = 0.22) and positively with education 338 level (ρ = 0.37), which in turn correlated negatively with each other (ρ = 0.50). Older, less 339 educated people tended to comply with laws with a greater frequency than younger, more 340 educated people; this is in accordance with other studies that have found age to be a significant 341 factor in determining compliance (58).
342
Our survey questions related to noncompliance were projective and prospective (asking 343 about others' noncompliance and estimates of future noncompliance) to protect respondents from 344 potential legal consequences of reporting their own past or present rule breaking. However, the 345 idea that noncompliance with regulations is prevalent in the Pantanal is not particularly 346 controversial, nor is the behavior particularly covert. This observation was amply supported by 347 anecdotal evidence from community members and personal experiences by the lead author 348 during the data collection period. Accounts contradicting the notion that noncompliance is 349 prevalent and overt tend to focus on more severe forms of rule breaking (e.g., using nets to catch 350 hundreds of pounds more than the permitted weight) compared with the relatively small violation 351 on which we focused here (50). For example, the majority of undersized fish we observed were 
374 2. Community perceptions of risk and management

375
A range of motivations were presented as underlying noncompliance with fisheries rules, 376 including lack of enforcement (n = 29, 70.7% agreed or agreed strongly that it was a factor) and 377 lack of knowledge of rules (n = 3, 7.3% agreed or agreed strongly). When individuals were asked 378 about their attitudes, most generally seemed aware of environmental problems and risks (Table   379 2). Many negatively viewed aspects of the management structure and the procedural fairness in 380 the region; however, most disagreed that the management agency was actively deceiving them. 381 382 498 decreasing rates of noncompliance among our study population.
499
Building trust is known to be challenging. Davenport et al. (42) showed that in spite of 500 clear indications that trust in management is necessary for success, a number of barriers exist to 501 building trust, including lack of community engagement, knowledge gaps, and competing values.
502 Many of these barriers appeared present in our study community. Very few of this study's 503 participants had interacted with scientists in the past, potentially explaining a lack of mutual 504 understanding and mismatching values. Rudolph & Riley (35) argued that gains in trust may be 505 possible through changes in structure of procedural justice of the management system.
506 Encouraging community members to share their voice can be critical for the success in a co-507 management system, and the fact that so many people in our case study group feel that 508 management did not listen to their views highlights one opportunity for potential improvement. It 509 is possible that more effective community engagement by scientists could help advance 510 community members' understanding about their participatory rights in the management 511 structure. This in turn might amplify positive perceptions of procedural justice of managers in 512 the community. Future research would help explore these ideas further.
513
Trust in scientists is unlikely to be the primary driver of noncompliance decisions in 514 every natural resource management system-our results are specific to one community in the 515 Pantanal. However, a confluence of considerations from the case study group and Brazilian 516 Pantanal may help explain the conditions under which trust in scientists may be more important 517 than other factors. First, the community of professional fishermen in the Pantanal is not unlike
